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Abstract
An evolving population, in which individual members (‘agents’) adapt
their behaviour according to past experience, is of central importance to many
disciplines. Because of their limited knowledge and capabilities, agents are
forced to make decisions based on inductive, rather than deductive, thinking.
We show that a population of competing agents with similar capabilities and
knowledge will tend to self-segregate into opposing groups characterized by
extreme behavior. Cautious agents perform poorly and tend to become rare.
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In physical systems, simple rules applied to a set of N ≥ 3 interacting objects can give
rise to complex dynamical behavior. Although generally intractable analytically, such prob-
lems are simplified considerably by the fact that the inter-particle interactions are typically
instantaneous, time-independent and decrease with increasing particle-particle separation.
An arguably more complex problem which is of central importance in social, economic and
biological sciences [1–5], is that of an evolving population in which individual members
(‘agents’) adapt their interactions, and hence behavior, according to their past experiences.
Even the two-player (N = 2) prisoners’ dilemma game played by memory-less agents on a
lattice, has been shown numerically to yield rich spatio-temporal patterns [6]. Evolutionary
game theory has been applied to such many-agent systems [7]. However it is well-known
that such analysis provides little insight into the system’s dynamics.
Of particular interest is the situation where agents repeatedly compete for a limited
resource, or to be in a minority. Rush-hour drivers, facing the nightly choice between two
alternative routes home, wish to choose the route containing the minority of traffic [8]. In
financial markets, more buyers than sellers implies higher prices; hence it is better for a trader
to be in the minority group of sellers. Animals (salesmen) foraging for food (customers) will
do better if they hunt in areas with fewer competitors. Regular attendees at a popular bar
may try to avoid over-crowded evenings [2,5]. More generally, the problem of how to flourish
in a population of equally ambitious people with similar capabilities, but where there are
typically more losers than winners, is one that many people face daily.
Here we introduce a simple, yet realistic, model for such an evolving population con-
taining adaptive agents who compete to be in the minority. Only partial information about
the system is available to the agents and no a priori ‘best’ strategy exists: agents are hence
forced to make decisions based on inductive, rather than deductive, thinking. Each agent
tries to learn from its past mistakes and will adjust its strategy in order to survive. We find
that a population of such agents with similar capabilities will tend to polarize itself into
opposing groups. Although a large number of possible strategies exist, the most successful
agents are those who behave in an extreme way.
Inspired by Ref. [9] we consider the model of an odd number N of agents repeatedly
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choosing whether to be in room ‘0’ or room ‘1’. These agents could be daily traders or rush-
hour drivers: choosing room ‘0’ denotes choosing to buy a given asset or choosing to take
route A, respectively, while ‘1’ denotes choosing to sell the asset or choosing to take route B.
After every agent has independently chosen a room, the winners are those in the minority
room, i.e. the room with fewer agents. The ‘output’ for each time-step is a single binary
digit denoting the winning room. Each agent is given a bit-string of length m containing
the previous m outcomes. Each agent also has access to a common register or ‘memory’
containing the outcomes from the most recent occurrences of all 2m possible bit-strings of
length m. Consider m = 3; denoting (xyz)w as the m = 3 bit-string (xyz) and outcome w,
an example memory would comprise (000)1, (001)0, (010)0, (011)1, (100)0, (101)1, (110)0,
(111)1. Following a run of three wins for room 0 in the recent past, the winning room was
subsequently 1. Faced with a given bit-string of length m, it might seem sensible for an
agent to simply predict the same outcome as that registered in the memory. The agent
will hence choose room 1 following the next 000 sequence. If 0 turns out to be the winning
room, the entry (000)1 in the memory is replaced by (000)0. If all N agents act in this way,
however, the system will be inefficient since all agents will choose the same room and will
hence lose; all the agents are spotting the same trends and assuming that they will continue
indefinitely. Because of this, the trend fails to continue. The critical quality of a successful
financial trader, for example, is the ability to follow a trend as long as it is valid, but to
correctly predict when it will end. Hence we assign each agent a single number or ‘strategy’
p: following a given m-bit sequence, p is the probability that the agent will choose the same
outcome as that stored in the memory, i.e. he will follow the current prediction, while 1− p
is the probability he will choose the opposite, i.e. he will reject the current prediction. Using
the example memory, the agent (e.g. trader or driver) will choose 1 (e.g. sell or take route
B) with probability p after spotting the sequence 000, and 0 (e.g. buy or take route A) with
probability 1− p.
Each time an agent gets into the minority (majority) room, he gains (loses) one point. If
the agent’s score falls below a value d < 0, then his strategy is modified, i.e. the agent gets
a new p value which is chosen with an equal probability from a range of values, centered
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on the old p, with a width equal to R. Hence d is the number of times (or the amount
of money) a driver (or trader) is willing to be wrong (or to lose) before modifying his/her
strategy. Although this is a fairly crude ‘learning’ rule as far as machines are concerned
[10], in our experience it is not too dissimilar from the way that humans actually behave
in practice. Since 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, we can for simplicity enforce reflective boundary conditions.
Our conclusions do not depend on the particular choice of boundary conditions (see Fig. 1).
Upon strategy modification, the agent’s score is reset to zero. Changing R allows the way
in which the agents learn to be varied. For R = 0, the strategies will never change (though
the memory will). If R = 2, the strategies before and after modification are uncorrelated.
For small R, the new p value is close to the old one.
As agents (e.g. traders or drivers) are constantly attempting to do the opposite of other
agents, a reasonable expectation is that they should eventually organise themselves so that
their strategies are evenly spread within 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Alternatively, given that no a priori
best strategy exists, one might expect that agents would be ambivalent as to whether a
present trend will continue, and hence cluster around p = 1
2
. Surprisingly, the opposite is
true. Figure 1(a) shows the frequency distribution P (p) at various times. The distribution
P (p) eventually becomes peaked around p = 0 and 1 (solid line) regardless of the initial
P (p) distribution; these p values respectively correspond to always or never following what
happened last time. The lifespan L(p), defined as the average length of time a strategy p
survives between modifications, shows similar behavior (solid line in Fig. 1(b)). Henceforth
we denote P (p) and L(p) as representing the long-time limits (solid lines). If we consider
the game simply as a random walk, with individual agents deciding randomly which room to
choose, we would expect the mean number in room 0 or 1 to beN/2 with a standard deviation
of
√
N/4. At each timestep, the net number of points awarded will therefore be −
√
N . The
average lifespan would be d
√
N . The observed average lifespan is indeed proportional to
d
√
N . However the average value of the L(p) in Fig. 1(b) (solid line) is larger than d
√
N by
a factor of approximately 2 for d = −4, confirming that the agents are organizing themselves
better than randomly. Furthermore, the root-mean-square (rms) separation of the strategies
is higher than the value for uniform P (p), indicating the desire of agents to do the opposite
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of the majority. It increases with N due to increased possibilities for self-organization. Even
when R is large, and the strategy values are hence picked randomly upon modification,
the rms strategy separation remains high. The rms strategy separation and the average
value of L(p) are typically maximal at R ∼ 0.5; this is a compromise between a lack of
learning when R ∼ 0 and excessive strategy modification for large R. We also note that the
standard deviation of the actual attendance time-series for room 0 (or room 1) is less than
that obtained for agents choosing via independent coin-tosses: this again confirms that the
system is organizing itself better than random.
Varying the length of the bit-string m has little effect on P (p) and L(p): since all agents
have similar capabilities and available information, these benefits tend to cancel out. It is
what each agent decides to do with the common knowledge which matters (p = 0, 1 agents
outperform p = 1
2
agents). Similarly if the memory is not updated dynamically according to
the recent outcomes as discussed earlier, but is instead kept constant (i.e. time-independent)
or is randomly chosen at each time-step, then P (p) and L(p) are also essentially unchanged.
Once again, the memory is common to all agents and hence all agents agree on the current
prediction: no agent hence has any relative advantage in terms of available information [11].
It has been shown for the basic minority game [12], in contrast to the claim in Ref. [11],
that the memory is relevant since it can introduce hidden correlations into the winning-room
time series. This point will be discussed in detail for the present model elsewhere.
We now provide some analytic analysis. The simplest example of our system contains
N = 3 agents i, j, k with brain-size m and three discrete p values p = 0, 1
2
, 1. (The fact
that N < 3 is impossible suggests that our system contains the level of complexity typically
associated with 3-body, versus 2-body, problems). All agents agree on the current prediction
(say 0). Agent i will choose 0 or 1 with probability pi and 1− pi respectively. Likewise for j
(pj) and k (pk). The 2
3 possible decisions for ijk are 000, 001, 010, 100, 110, 101, 011, 111.
There are 33 = 27 possible configurations (pi, pj, pk). For a given (pi, pj, pk), the 8 possible
decisions yield the expected gain for the agents. For example for (pi, pj, pk) = (0, 0,
1
2
), i
and j both choose 1 while k chooses 0 with probability 1
2
. Hence k wins with probability 1
2
whereas i and j both lose. The net number of points gained per agent per turn, given by
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the points awarded minus the points deducted, is −1 for i, −1 for j, and 0 for k. The total
is hence −2. Given that the maximum is −1 (there is a maximum of one winner) we see
that (0, 0, 1
2
) is not optimal.
Table 1 shows the various configuration types, or classes. The last column shows the
average points per agent: [−1
2
] for class i) implies the average agent loses −1
2
point per
turn, and would hence modify its strategy after time 2d. Such strategy modification allows
the system to sample the 27 configurations. Classes vi), vii) and viii) are optimal, having
maximum points. To obtain the average distribution P (p) and L(p), we must average over
all 27 configurations. Since some classes are more favourable (i.e., more points) we should
weight the distributions in an appropriate way. In the extreme case of large weighting, we
include only the optimal classes vi), vii) and viii), yielding P (0) : P (1
2
) : P (1)= 2.5 : 1 : 2.5
and L(0) : L(1
2
) : L(1)= 5 : 1 : 5. For zero weighting, we instead consider the system as
visiting all configurations with equal probability regardless of points gained per agent; such a
zero-weight averaging is similar to that for the microstates in a gas within the microcanonical
ensemble and yields P (0) : P (1
2
) : P (1)= 1 : 1 : 1 and L(0) : L(1
2
) : L(1)= 1 : 1 : 1. For an
intermediate case, whereby all classes are weighted by the average points per agent, we obtain
P (0) : P (1
2
) : P (1)= 1.1 : 1 : 1.1 and L(0) : L(1
2
) : L(1)= 1.5 : 1 : 1.5. In fact, any sensible
weighting which favours the more profitable configurations yields a non-uniform P (p) and
L(p) as observed numerically. This implies that the population, by self-segregating, has also
managed to self-organize itself around the most profitable configurations. We emphasize
that the system is dynamic since the membership of the various configurations is constantly
changing (i, j and k inter-diffuse) but P (p) remains essentially constant. For general N we
can loosely think of i, j, k as three equal-size groups of like-minded agents.
In summary, we have shown that an evolving population of agents with similar capabil-
ities and information will self-segregate. To flourish in such a population, an agent should
behave in an extreme way (p = 0 or p = 1).
We thank D. Challet and P. Binder for discussions.
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TABLES
TABLE I. Configuration classes showing the distribution of the three agents (each denoted
by x) and the average points awarded per time-step for each strategy-value p. Also given are
the number of distinct configurations per class, and the average number of points per agent per
time-step.
Class p = 0 p = 1/2 p = 1 No. configs. Ave pts/agent
i) xxx[-1/2][-1/2][-1/2] 1 [-1/2]
ii) x[-1/2] xx[-1/2][-1/2] 3 [-1/2]
iii) xx[-1][-1] x[0] 3 [-2/3]
iv) xxx[-1][-1][-1] 1 [-1]
v) xxx[-1][-1][-1] 1 [-1]
vi) x[1] xx[-1][-1] 3 [-1/3]
vii) xx[-1][-1] x[1] 3 [-1/3]
viii) x[0] x[-1] x[0] 6 [-1/3]
ix) xx[-1/2][-1/2] x[-1/2] 3 [-1/2]
x) x[0] xx[-1][-1] 3 [-2/3]
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Distribution of (a) strategies P (p). At t = 0, P (p) was chosen to be flat. Dashed
line shows P (p) at intermediate times. Solid line shows P (p) at large times. (b) Corre-
sponding lifespans L(p). The parameters R = 0.2, N = 101, d = −4 and m = 3. Dotted
lines show the long-time distributions using periodic (as opposed to reflective) boundary
conditions.
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